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REASONING OF NON AND PRELINGUISTIC 
CREATURES: HOW MUCH DO THE 
EXPERIMENTS TELL US?1
Abstract. If a conclusion was reached that creatures without a language capability exhibit 
some form of a capability for logic, this would shed a new light on the relationship between 
logic, language, and thought. Recent experimental attempts to test whether some animals, 
as well as pre-linguistic human infants, are capable of exclusionary reasoning are taken to 
support exactly that conclusion. The paper discusses the analyses and conclusions of two 
such studies: Call’s (2004) two cups task, and Mody and Carey’s (2016) four cups task. 
My paper exposes hidden assumptions within these analyses, which enable the authors 
to settle on the explanation which assigns logical capabilities to the participants of the 
studies, as opposed to the explanations which do not. The paper then demonstrates that 
the competing explanations of the experimental results are theoretically underdeveloped, 
rendering them unclear in their predictions concerning the behavior of cognitive subjects, 
and thus difficult to distinguish by use of experiments. Additionally, it is questioned 
whether the explanations are rivals at all, i.e. whether they compete to explain the 
cognitive processes of the same level. The contribution of the paper is conceptual. Its aim 
is to clear up the concepts involved in these analyses, in order to avoid oversimplified or 
premature conclusions about the cognitive abilities of pre- and non-linguistic creatures. It 
is also meant to show that the theoretical space surrounding the issues involved might be 
much more diverse and unknown than many of these studies imply.
Keywords: cognitive processes, deduction, probabilistic reasoning, animal cognition, 
infant cognition
Introduction
Theories in cognitive science and philosophy of mind strive to fit the 
results of experimental psychology. However, the results themselves typically 
do not hand us conclusive answers, so they have to be analyzed, and the 
analysis is in turn subject to theoretical assessment. In this paper I examine the 
assumptions behind the analysis of certain experimental results concerning the 
possible reasoning mechanisms of non- and pre-linguistic creatures.
1 The work on this paper has been supported by the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia through the project Logico-
epistemological bases of science and metaphysics (No. 179067). I am also very grateful to 
Jacob Beck for reading the drafts of the paper and making useful comments about it.
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Certain behavior is consistent with a capability for reasoning from an 
excluded alternative: the recognition that if there are only two possibilities 
and it is not one of them, it must be the other. Recently, there have been 
attempts to experimentally test whether some animals, as well as pre-linguistic 
human infants, are capable of this kind of reasoning. I focus on the analysis 
of two studies which test the reasoning abilities of these creatures by setting 
up a task that needs to be solved. Call’s (2004) two cups task tested whether 
great apes are capable of reasoning by exclusion, and since the apes proved 
to be successful at the task, the other study – Mody and Carey’s (2016) four 
cups task – proposed a way to determine the mechanism responsible for that 
kind of reasoning.2 I will demonstrate that there is a mistaken assumption 
in the analysis of the latter study, and that we cannot decide among the 
competing explanations based on the strategy proposed by the authors. I will 
further show that the two main competing explanations cannot be clearly 
distinguished from each other, because their assumptions, requirements, and 
implications are not sufficiently defined. As a consequence, the experiments 
conducted so far, as well as future attempts to decide between them using 
experimental research, might be misguided.
Reasoning by exclusion and possible underlying
mechanisms
In Call’s task, the subjects see the experimenter hiding the reward in one 
of two cups, not knowing which one. They then receive evidence that one 
cup is empty. If they reason by exclusion, they should use the information 
about the empty cup to exclude that location, and instead select the other 
cup. The subjects proved successful at this task (the rate of correct choices 
was significantly above chance), and their success can be interpreted and 
explained by several accounts. The term “reasoning by exclusion” does not 
make commitments as to the particular reasoning mechanism being used 
(Mody & Carey, 2016).
The results of this task were taken by many commenters to indicate that 
the animals manifest a capability for reasoning by the disjunctive syllogism. 
The subjects supposedly reasoned: The food is either in A or B. It is not in 
A. Therefore it is in B. This interpretation imposes the highest cognitive 
requirements: it requires the subjects to be representing the concepts OR 
and NOT as well as the dependent relationship between A and B (embodied 
2 The reader will notice that the two studies are done with different subjects (the latter 
study was done with human children). Moreover, the older children that were successful 
in the latter experiment clearly do not fall into the group of pre-linguistic creatures. 
Although this would make a difference for the plausibility of the thesis that is being 
tested, I, however, do not take this difference to be significant for my analysis, since I am 
interested in the methodology of these experiments, rather than in the results themselves. 
I focus on the difficulty of interpreting the behavioral data, regardless of the particular 
subjects and results of the study.
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by the concept OR). The dependent relationship is what leads the subjects 
to update their representation of B when they see that A is empty, and to 
conclude that B necessarily contains the reward. Updating of B based on the 
information about A is referred to in the literature as 'inferential updating 
(Mody & Carey, 2016).
Another interpretation is named “Maybe A, maybe B”. The subjects 
initially believe that the reward might be in A, and also that it might be in 
B. The two possible hiding locations are regarded independently: gaining the 
information about A does not lead to inferential updating which would form 
a new appraisal of B. Thus, when they see that A is empty, they do not search 
in A anymore, and they proceed to B according to their initial premise that it 
might contain the reward (Mody & Carey, 2016).
The results can also be explained with even fewer cognitive demands. 
According to the “Avoid empty” interpretation, the animals have no particular 
beliefs about whether B contains the reward. They are merely not searching in A. 
When they see that A is empty, they avoid searching in it, and instead approach 
B merely because it is the other salient hiding location available. This does not 
even require representing the alternatives A and B as potential locations of the 
reward, so there is also no inferential updating (Mody & Carey, 2016).
Rescorla (2009) proposed another possible mechanism underlying 
exclusionary reasoning: probabilistic inference over the space of cognitive 
maps. Rescorla defines cognitive maps as mental representations that 
represent geometric features of the physical environment. Their most 
important feature is not having logical form. This allows them to be realized 
without the subject’s capability for logic. The key part of Rescorla’s analysis 
is the Bayesian decision theory, which gives calculations for the distribution 
of probabilities over cognitive maps. Probabilities assigned to cognitive maps 
can be understood as degrees of belief assigned to different hypotheses. The 
subjects recognize two possible locations of the hidden reward, represented 
by two cognitive maps (M1, M2). The maps correspond to two hypotheses 
concerning which cup has the reward in it. The subjects initially lack evidence 
regarding where the reward is hidden, so the initial probability distribution 
treats cups the same:
p(M1) = p(M2) = 0.5
Since they exhaust the space of possibilities, their probabilities sum up to 1.
Also, for each cup there are two possible outcomes: yi – the cup has food 
in it, and ni – the cup is empty, and their probabilities also sum up to 1: p(yi) 
+ p(ni) = 1.
Assuming Mi is true, the probability that the subjects will recognize that 
the reward is in the cup is taken to be p(yi|Mi) = 0.8, since the account allows 
the small possibility of the subject not seeing the reward even if it is looking 
in the right cup.
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Since p(yi)+p(ni)=1, it follows that the chance of false negatives is 
p(ni|Mi)= 0.2
There is also a slight chance of false positives, say, p(yi|Mj)=0.1, which 
makes the chance of a correct observation that the cup is empty p(ni|Mj)=0.9.
When the subject is presented with the evidence that the first cup is empty, 
the probabilities are updated over the cognitive maps using Bayes’ Law:
p(M1|n1) = 0.182
p(M2|n1) = 0.818
The initial probability of 0.5 is lowered for M1 to 0.182, while M2 is 
updated to 0.818, by the process of inferential updating (since the two cups are 
represented as being in a disjunctive relationship). Thus, the subject reaches a 
conclusion that it is more probable that the reward is in cup B than that it is in A.
All four interpretations can explain the experimental results, because using 
any of these approaches would lead subjects to be successful in the task. Subsequent 
experiments were designed to distinguish between these interpretations. I focus 
on Mody and Carey’s (2016) study, which tested for behavioral evidence of 
inferential updating. This should then distinguish between the deductive and 
probabilistic interpretations on one side, and the remaining two interpretations 
which predict no inferential updating on the other side.
Distinguishing between the interpretations
The following experiment was conceived as an extended version of Call’s 
task. Two rewards (in this study the rewards were stickers) were hidden in 
four cups, one reward in each of two pairs. The first pair of cups was covered 
by a screen so that the subject could not see which of the cups the reward was 
placed in, and then the same was done with the second pair. The participants 
were children from 2.5 to 5 years old, divided into four groups by their age. 
When one of the cups was revealed to be empty, the child was supposed to 
pick the other cup from the pair, which is certain to contain a reward.
If children were using the deductive syllogism, they would engage in 
inferential updating, meaning that the information about the empty cup 
(not-A), in combination with the representation of where the sticker was 
hidden (A or B), would lead them to conclude that the other cup from 
the pair necessarily contained the sticker (therefore B). This interpretation 
predicts children will choose the “target cup” (B).
If they were using the “Maybe A, maybe B” strategy, obtaining the 
information “not-A” would not lead to updating information about B. The 
children would still hold on to “Maybe B”, and all the remaining cups would 
seem to be equally good candidates. Thus, the children would choose the 
target cup at an equal rate as the other two cups.
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According to the “Avoid empty” strategy, learning “not-A” would lead to 
avoiding A, but without representations about other possible locations. Thus, 
the subjects would also be expected to choose all three remaining cups at an 
equal rate (Mody & Carey, 2016).
Mody and Carey seem to take the probabilistic account to predict that 
the children will pick the target cup preferentially to the other cups (due 
to inferential updating). Still, they seem to take probabilistic reasoning as 
somewhat “less certain” than deductive reasoning. Thus, the probabilistic 
interpretation might predict preferential choosing of the target cup, but at 
a somewhat lower rate than in the deductive scenario. I will address this in 
more detail in the following section.
Prior to the main task, there was a training phase, which involved only 
three cups: one pair of cups and one single cup, hidden behind two screens. 
The procedure of hiding the rewards was the same: the first reward was 
placed in the single cup, and the second reward was placed in one of the 
cups from a pair. After removing the screen, the child was asked to choose 
a cup. This task did not require reasoning by exclusion, but it still required 
comparing the sure cup to the two uncertain cups.
Results and analysis
In the training trials chance was established at 33%, since there were three 
cups to choose among. The children chose the target cup at rates significantly 
above chance. In the test trials, since the children virtually never chose the 
empty cup, it was taken that three cups were the remaining options, and 
chance was also set at 33%. The results were very similar to the training phase. 
All groups except for the youngest chose the target cup significantly above 
chance, suggesting that they engaged in inferential updating. The youngest 
children chose the target cup in only 36% of the cases, not significantly above 
chance. They behaved in a manner predicted by the “Maybe A, maybe B”, and 
“Avoid empty” interpretations. The rates of choosing the correct cup in both 
phases of the experiment are given in the table.
Training trials Test trials
Age group Success rate Age group Success rate
2.5 47% 2.5 36%
3 60% 3 58%
4 71% 4 64%
5 72% 5 76%
These results indicate that, except for 2.5-year-olds, the children chose 
the target cup preferentially, and thus behaved in a manner consistent 
with inferential updating. This allows accepting only the probabilistic and 
deductive interpretations as possible, while dismissing the others.
We can sum up the main issue as follows.
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In the training trials, an observation that cup A is full leads to representing 
cup A as sure and cups B and C as unsure, which leads to reaching for cup A.
In the test trials, an observation that cup A is empty leads to representing 
cup A as sure (empty), cups C and D as unsure, and leads to updating the 
representation of cup B from unsure to sure (full), and reaching for it.
The two possible interpretations of the results aim to answer the question: 
What is the cognitive process that leads to updating of cup B from “unsure” 
to “sure (full)”?
According to the probabilistic interpretation, the subjects engage in 
Bayesian redistribution of coupled probabilities (synchronously lowering the 
probability of cup A and rising the probability of cup B), while representing 
cups C and D as independent probabilities and as remaining unsure.
According to the deductive interpretation, the subjects engage in a logical 
inference: “The reward is either in A or B. It is not in A. Therefore it is in B”. 
Cups C and D are not included in the inference, since they are represented as 
independent from A and B.
Mody and Carey go further to claim that the deductive interpretation 
is more plausible. Their strategy was to additionally formulate the difference 
between these two cognitive processes in terms of certainty: deductive 
reasoning would lead to a choice based on absolute certainty that the reward is 
in cup B, while the probabilistic one would lead to a choice based on increased 
certainty (the subjects are only more certain that the reward is in B than that it 
is in any of the other cups). They then propose a way of distinguishing between 
these two mechanisms, claiming that one feature of the gathered data indicates 
absolute certainty behind the children’s choice. Namely, the children chose the 
target cup just as often in test trials as in training trials – in which they could 
directly observe (and thus be absolutely certain about) where the sticker was 
hidden. These results suggest that children were absolutely certain in the test 
trials, too. In other words, since the rate of choosing the correct cup was the 
same in the trials which required reasoning as in the trials which did not, their 
reasoning was interpreted as absolutely certain, and therefore, deductive:
Our design did not allow us to distinguish between a choice based 
on absolute certainty and one based on increased certainty. The latter 
would still require that children represented the dependent relationship 
between the two locations, and that they inferentially updated their 
assessment (...); however, the inference children made would not be 
truly deductive. This possibility was put forth by Rescorla (2009), who 
described it in a Bayesian framework, where the probability associated 
with one possibility is adjusted up as the probability of another 
possibility goes down. However, one feature of our data suggests that 
children were making a deductive inference: 3- to 5-year-old children 
chose the target cup just as often in test trials as they did in training 
trials, in which they could directly observe that a sticker was being 
hidden there (Mody & Carey, 2016, p. 46).
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I will proceed to criticize Mody and Carey’s characterization of the 
two reasoning mechanisms by different degrees of certainty. I will first 
demonstrate that this characterization is false, and then I will show that 
probabilistic updating of coupled probabilities cannot be distinguished from 
explicit inferences (for now), and that these two cognitive processes may even 
be only variants of each other, instead of being independent strategies.
Analysis of the analysis
Mody and Carey make a mistake of confounding two possible applications 
of the property of certainty. One is the certainty that defines deduction, 
and applies to the transition from the premises to the conclusion: in a valid 
deductive argument, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the 
conclusion. Thus, the subject can be certain that if the premises are true, 
the conclusion must also be true. But this does not tell us how certain the 
subject was in either of the premises, nor of the conclusion. The latter type 
of certainty applies to the propositions themselves, and it can have various 
degrees. The rules of “probability preservation”, or “uncertainty propagation” 
are defined within propositional probability logics. The main idea is that the 
premises of a valid argument can be uncertain, in which case the conclusion 
will also be uncertain (Demey et al., 2017). Therefore, the deductive account 
does not necessarily predict children will be absolutely certain that the reward 
is in cup B. It needs to additionally postulate that they are absolutely certain 
of the premises. This type of certainty is what is of interest for the experiment, 
because the degree of certainty about the final conclusion is what affects the 
subjects’ behavior, and thus the percentages that Mody and Carey appeal to. 
Let us see how this type of certainty is accommodated within the two accounts.
In the probabilistic account, the distribution of degrees of certainty is 
determined mathematically, according to the Bayes’ Law. We saw in Rescorla’s 
account that it allows the possibility of subjects making both false negative, 
and false positive judgements, due to their fallibility. This is reflected in not 
assigning absolute certainty to even the seemingly obvious observations, such 
as “A is empty.” Thus, the “premise” (“Reward is in A”) gains a probability 
slightly higher than 0. This, in turn, renders the probability of the conclusion 
“Reward is in B” as slightly less than 1. The probabilities assigned to cups C and 
D should be equal, and the same as in the initial distribution (0.5). Therefore, 
if the subjects reasoned probabilistically, they would indeed make a choice 
based on “increased certainty” of B over other options, just as Mody and Carey 
suggest.
In the deductive account, however, degrees of certainty have not been 
mentioned. The experimenters expect absolute certainty by default, and the 
percentages of failure of subjects to perform the task (which were at least 
30% of choices, as we saw in the table) are explained by appealing to “noise” 
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or “performance issues”, such as limitations of attention, working memory, 
or other factors. (Mody & Carey, 2016, pp. 46–7). So far, it seems that the 
probabilistic account has a better formal apparatus for dealing with the 
degrees of certainty. Still, there are probably several ways in which they could 
be incorporated in the deductive account as well. One way would be to assign 
probabilities to the propositions, like it is done in the probabilistic semantics. 
We can have a probability function for the propositional language L, and the 
valuations v: L→{0,1} of classical propositional logic can be replaced with 
probability functions P: L→ ℝ, which take values in the real unit interval [0,1]. 
The classical truth values of true (1) and false (0) can thus be regarded as the 
endpoints of the unit interval [0,1]. This would mean taking classical logic as 
a special case of probability logic, or equivalently, taking probability logic as 
an extension of classical logic (Demey et al., 2017). Applying this to the cups 
task, we can formally express the subject’s deductive reasoning as follows:
P(A ∨ B)=1
P(¬A)=0.9
Therefore, P(B)=0.93
In cognitive terms, the probabilities could be defined within a meta-
cognitive level, without being explicitly represented by the subject. Thus, 
even though the subjects reason through a logical inference, each step in the 
inference (e.g. ¬A) may be accompanied by a degree of subject’s certainty about 
the step. However, it is difficult to specify how the probabilities of two or more 
premises are to be combined. Some advocates of this kind of extension of 
classical logic propose a rule that “a p-valid inference cannot take us from low 
uncertainty in the premises to high uncertainty in the conclusion”. They define 
the uncertainty of a proposition p as one minus its probability, 1—P(p). Then 
an inference with two or more premises is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty 
of its conclusion is not greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises 
for all coherent probability assignments (Evans et al., 2015).
This version of the deductive account needs to be further theoretically 
developed. Nevertheless, the outline shows a way to implement different 
degrees of certainty into the deductive account. In application to Mody 
and Carey’s results, even though it was shown that there are two separate 
applications of certainty, that still does not prove that they were wrong in 
assigning absolute certainty to subjects reasoning deductively. Indeed, we do 
not know how certain the subjects were of any of their propositions.
Difference between the competing accounts
This brings me to the final point of this paper. What is the difference 
between the deductive and probabilistic accounts? How can we behaviorally 
3 The numerical values of probabilities are just an example.
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distinguish which of these two reasoning mechanisms the subject is using? 
I claim that the two accounts are not sufficiently developed, and not clear 
in their theoretical requirements. This renders them unclear in their 
predictions concerning the behavior of cognitive subjects, and thus difficult 
to distinguish by use of experiments. I will show this by presenting several 
possible candidates by which these accounts might be differentiated.
Degrees of certainty
As I demonstrated, since probabilities (and thus the degrees of certainty) 
can be accommodated within the deductive account, it is unclear whether the 
accounts differ in the degrees of certainty assigned to the conclusion. Thus, 
we do not know whether it is possible to differentiate them empirically – 
whether they predict different percentages of successful task performances. It 
is yet to be shown that there would be a difference at all.
Format of mental representations
Another way to distinguish them might be by the format of the mental 
representations they posit. The accounts were presented as positing different 
kinds of mental representations: the probabilistic reasoning was presented 
as defined over cognitive maps, while the deductive reasoning is taken 
to be computed over proposition-like mental representations, and made 
available by language (Bermudez, 2006). Rescorla’s probabilistic account 
was formulated partly as a way to enable computing sophisticated reasoning 
over non-propositional mental representations. However, neither of these 
accounts is necessarily tied solely to their respective representational formats. 
Probabilistic reasoning may also be computed over propositions – the 
hypotheses which the probabilities are assigned to may as well be in the form 
of propositions. That is, in fact, exactly how the probability distribution over 
competing hypotheses is most often presented (Rescorla, 2009).
In addition, even though it is not the most popular opinion among 
cognitive scientists, there are some authors (e.g. the advocates of diagrammatic 
reasoning) who claim that logical reasoning can be defined over non-linguistic 
representations, and that there is no intrinsic difference between symbolic 
and diagrammatic systems as far as their logical status goes (Shin & Lemon, 
2018). This would imply that proposition-like mental representations might 
not be necessary for logical reasoning. Thus, each of these two accounts could 
be modelled quite differently from the versions of them proposed so far, and 
this would certainly reflect on their behavioral implications, significant for 
the experimental testing.
Logical structure
The most important difference between these accounts is supposed to 
be whether they commit to logical structure – whether they describe the 
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subject’s reasoning as proceeding by logical rules, or by some other kind of 
inference. The deductive account clearly appeals to the logical structure of the 
deductive syllogism. The probabilistic account purportedly does not involve 
a logical structure, but is instead structured as a distribution of probabilities 
over a space of hypotheses (which in Rescorla’s account have the form of 
cognitive maps). However, this attempt at differentiating the two accounts 
also has its difficulties. First, it is not clear how this difference might, if at all, 
be behaviorally manifested. Thus far, we have no means to experimentally 
test between these accounts. Second, it is an open question whether Bayesian 
reasoning is truly an alternative to reasoning by the disjunctive syllogism, or 
one way of implementing it – which might explain why they are also difficult 
to differentiate behaviorally. As Mody (2016) observed, 
the construction of the hypothesis space [in the probabilistic 
account] requires that children enumerate the relevant possibilities, and 
the inference mechanics maintain a fundamentally disjunctive relation 
between them. Further, the lowering of probability associated with 
gaining negative information essentially implements negation. Thus, 
even if reasoning proceeds probabilistically, propositional representations 
including negation and disjunction might be required to represent the 
information that the probabilistic mechanism uses as input.
In other words, it is unclear whether probabilistic reasoning is, in fact, 
dependent on some form of logical reasoning, or on some logical concepts 
at least. It is at least sophisticated enough to involve the ability to distinguish 
between coupled and independent probabilities. I agree with Mody that the 
experimental results presented here do give evidence of representing negation 
and disjunction in some way. However, they do not necessarily imply full-
blown logical inference.
Simplicity of explanation
In referring to the results of similar experiments indicative of the existence 
of basic logical reasoning in 12- and 19-month-old human infants, Arlotti 
and colleagues (2018) admit that a Bayesian probabilistic model of reasoning 
could also explain the results: “Bayesian iterative models (...) could mimic 
deductive syllogism without assuming a logical inference.” However, they 
argue that the probabilistic explanation, although compatible with the results, 
has more requirements than if we only assume the infants are performing a 
logical inference. It requires that infants represent the space of alternatives 
(which is equivalent to implementing a disjunctive representation), assign 
ordered priors to the alternatives, and assess alternative evaluations iteratively 
(Arlotti 2018).
Arlotti and colleagues thus defend the deductive explanation of their 
own results, but differently than the previous authors – merely as a more 
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parsimonious explanation of the results. However, this defence is still not 
unquestionable. One of the reasons is that it is not clear whether the probabilistic 
account actually commits to the assumptions brought up by Arlotti, especially 
if those assumptions imply an explicit representation of assigning probabilities 
to hypotheses, or of assessing the alternatives. Rescorla (2009) describes 
this assignment of probabilities as consisting in “suitable function relations 
between cognitive maps and mental representations denoting numbers”. For a 
cognitive subject to assign probabilities really means “to enter a mental state 
bearing appropriate functional relations to other mental states”. Rescorla seems 
to think that the complex probabilistic computations can be performed at 
lower-level processes of cognition (and perception), and does not really clarify 
what exactly the probabilistic account posits as being explicitly represented 
by the cognitive subjects. Thus, the last possible candidate used for deciding 
between the deductive and the probabilistic accounts – parsimoniousness of 
the explanation – is also rendered unusable, due to the lack of knowledge 
about the exact assumptions of the accounts.
In conclusion, it is difficult to distinguish the reasoning mechanisms by 
their behavioral signatures when the implications of the theories that posit 
them have not been made clear. These accounts have not been developed in 
sufficient detail, and the experimental psychologists should bare this in mind 
in order to avoid oversimplified or premature conclusions about the cognitive 
abilities of pre- and non-linguistic creatures. In addition, the theoretical space 
surrounding these issues might be much more diverse and unknown than 
these studies imply.
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